1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
3	CLIFF THOMAS,) Case 1:16-cv-01581
4	Plaintiff,)
5	v.) Alexandria, Virginia
6) July 14, 2017 RAYMOND ROBERTS, <i>et al</i> .,) 10:56 a.m.
7	Defendants.)) Pages 1 - 22
8	
9	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANTHONY J. TRENGA
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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25	COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES

 $\verb|Rhonda| F. Montgomery OCR-USDC/EDVA (703) 299-4599$

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2.4
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THE CLERK: Civil Action 1:16-cv-1581, Cliff
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  Thomas v. Raymond Roberts, et al.
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             Will counsel please identify themselves for
4
   the record.
5
             MS. WATSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
   Cathryne Watson for the plaintiff, Cliff Thomas.
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7
             THE COURT:
                         Good morning.
                         Good morning, Your Honor.
8
             MR. VIETH:
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  Vieth of Hirschler Fleischer for the Curtis defendants,
  and with me is my colleague, Mr. Alex Boyd, of our
11
  office.
12
             THE COURT:
                         Welcome.
13
             MR. OSTER:
                         Good morning, Your Honor. Steven
14
  Oster for Donald and Kimberly Berlin, defendants.
15
  Thank you, Your Honor, for the privilege of appearing
  in your court this morning.
17
             MR. GUTKOWSKI: Good morning, Your Honor.
18
  David Gutkowski of Odin, Feldman & Pittleman on behalf
19
  of Zachary and Gena Casagrande.
20
             MR. WAYNE: Good morning, Your Honor.
21
  Charles Wayne on behalf of the Roberts defendants.
22
             THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Wayne.
23
             We're here on a motion for attorneys' fees in
  connection with the dismissed claims against the
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I've reviewed the filings.

dismissed defendants.

be pleased to hear from counsel as far as what they don't think they've already adequately explained to the Court.

MR. VIETH: Thank you, Your Honor. Again Robert Vieth for the Curtis defendants, Your Honor.

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We do recognize the standard in this case is a high one. It's really whether the complaint was frivolous or groundless. For that reason, these motions are somewhat unusual or perhaps extraordinary. I don't believe I've ever filed one, but this is a case where we think attorneys' fees are warranted.

There is really no basis for the claims that were filed against Mr. and Mrs. Curtis and especially, as we've said in our papers, Mrs. Curtis.

THE COURT: Based on what you and the other counsel have provided, is there any way the Court can assess what the incremental cost was of representing the wives as opposed to the husbands?

MR. VIETH: I think that would be difficult, Your Honor, because we did represent both. The claims were identical as against both. The factual circumstances were somewhat different. But candidly, when we were working on the case, we did not separate out -- we were raising the same arguments by and large on behalf of each of those defendants.

I actually would submit to Your Honor that 1 even as against Mr. Curtis, this case was groundless and frivolous. The actions in the complaint were thin to say the least. I would suggest to the Court that 5 there are at least a couple of circumstances applicable here that don't appear in every dismissed case brought 7 under the civil rights acts that certainly suggest that ∥in Your Honor's discretion -- this is a discretionary call on Your Honor's part of course. But it suggest that Your Honor should exercise your discretion to at 10 11 least award some fees here.

This is not just a stand-alone lawsuit 13 really. It was an outgrowth of proceedings that continue to be litigated in Loudon County Circuit Court. It was really multiplication of legal proceedings that, in this case, was, I think, These claims or similar claims could have unwarranted. been raised in Loudoun County. By the way, that case was referred to in the complaint, and the complaint even acknowledged the defendants here, the defendants' success in that case there.

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THE COURT: What do you say to the notion which I see not explicitly stated, pretty much infused into the plaintiff's position that this case really should be considered within the context of the notion

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that based on all the facts and circumstances, this was a good faith effort to expand the law based on -- to extend to a claim that a racially motivated lawsuit, albeit one that proved successful at least up to this point, is actionable under 1981 if not some of these other claims?

MR. VIETH: I didn't quite understand the plaintiff to be making the argument quite the way Your Honor framed it, but I think that argument at the end is not sufficient to overcome the claim for attorneys' fees here.

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The Third Circuit spoke to, I think, this very issue in the Barnes Foundation case that we've cited in the papers where the court in 2001 essentially issued a warning to plaintiffs who were filing lawsuits like this against defendants for the defendants exercising their First Amendment rights by filing a lawsuit or by petitioning government officials. The Third Circuit made it clear that while the law up to that point may have been somewhat mucky, from this point on, every plaintiff like this is on notice that they're doing this at their peril, in the words of the court, because it is clear that this is an attempt to chill the First Amendment rights of the defendants. That is the second circumstance that I think really

makes this case one that is appropriate for some sort of deterrent.

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This type of case is -- well, the claims in this case, Your Honor, are serious ones. No person likes to be accused of engaging in racial animosity or racially motivated conduct. That's the allegation that was made in this case, and there was simply no basis for it.

When it is, in fact, an effort to chill or would have the effect of chilling First Amendment 11 rights that the defendants had, it is all the more 12 degregious, Your Honor. Frankly, it tends to trivialize what can sometimes be in some cases, not this one, but in other cases serious racially motivated conduct. There was just zero evidence of that here. Even the allegations on the face of the complaint were insufficient to move forward.

I'm sure Your Honor takes no pleasure in going through legal bills and the like. The good news here is there seems to be no challenge as to rates. There seems to be only the most casual challenges to some of the time entries. We'd be happy to address that if you'd like.

I think unless the Court has any questions, I would be happy to rest on that and on our papers.

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             THE COURT:
                         All right. Thank you.
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             MR. VIETH:
                         Thank you.
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             THE COURT:
                         Counsel.
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             MR. GUTKOWSKI: Yes, Your Honor.
                                                I have very
 5
   little to add, frankly.
             THE COURT: You're appearing on behalf of?
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             MR. GUTKOWSKI:
                             The Casagrandes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         The Casagrandes.
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             MR. GUTKOWSKI:
                             Dr. Casagrande and
  Mrs. Casagrande.
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11
             We would adopt the arguments made by
12 Mr. Vieth, and we don't need to belabor the point.
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             If you have any questions about our papers,
  I'd be happy to answer them.
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             There are two things that I would like to add
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  to Mr. Vieth's argument. One is not only do we have
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  the face of the complaint, which is thread bare of
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  anything other than conclusory statements related to
19 any sort of discriminatory intent or any actions taken
20 by any of these codefendants, we also now have the
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  benefit of discovery closing. In the opposition to the
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  instant motions, it was devoid of any evidence
  supporting any factual allegations made in the
24 | complaint.
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             As to Mr. Casagrande or Dr. Casagrande, I
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should say, as we point out in our papers, there's a very, frankly, reckless allegation made in the complaint that's echoed within the first amended complaint where Dr. Casagrande approached an arborist working on the plaintiff's yard and asked him why he was working for a quote, unquote, black man. That's in 7 paragraph 20 of the first amended complaint.

As Your Honor, I'm sure, read in our submissions, Mr. Thomas was under oath at the Loudon County Court and plainly stated that he has no clue whether or not Dr. Casagrande was that person or if 12 Dr. Casagrande was even there. He objected to the question on the grounds of hearsay. I don't mean to make light of it, Your Honor, but it's a fairly remarkable passage that I'm sure Your Honor has reviewed.

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So even as to the one factual allegation in the complaint that could somehow be tied to some sort of racial animus as to Dr. Casagrande, he's already recanted that. He's already stated under oath he has no clue whether or not that's true. Yet, here it is in his complaint as has been echoed in his first amended complaint, Your Honor.

Again, regarding our fees, if you have any questions about our fees, I'm happy to answer them or ... 10

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any of our other submissions. Otherwise, Your Honor,
  I'll also rest on that.
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             THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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             MR. GUTKOWSKI:
                             Thank you very much, Your
 5
  Honor.
 6
                         Good morning. Steven Oster on
             MR. OSTER:
 7
  behalf of Donald and Kimberly Berlin. Unless Your
  Honor has some specific questions regarding the
  Berlins' submission, I'll adopt the arguments of
  cocounsel and not take up any more of Your Honor's
11
  time.
12
             THE COURT:
                         All right. Thank you.
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             MR. OSTER:
                         Thank you, Judge.
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             THE COURT: Anyone else?
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        (No response.)
                         All right.
16
             THE COURT:
                                     Counsel.
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             MS. WATSON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
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             As Your Honor knows, attorneys' fees against
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  a federal civil rights plaintiff is an extreme
  sanction, and it's a chilling sanction.
                                            It's an
21
  extraordinary one, and it's not appropriate in this
22
  case.
23
             As we try to describe in our papers, the
24 state law in litigation is not meant to be repealed.
25 It's not meant to be appealed or relitigated by these
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federal civil rights claims, but they are necessarily relevant facts to the plaintiff's claims.

So what he knew when he filed this complaint and made these claims was that the defendant's husband had approached him and his wife, the plaintiff and his wife, and told him that he wasn't going to be able to use his property how he wanted.

THE COURT: This is at the Panera meeting, correct?

MS. WATSON: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There are no allegations that there were any racial slurs or statements in the context of that particular meeting; was there?

MS. WATSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

The Supreme Court has said that racial discrimination is usually not explicit. It's usually shown by circumstantial evidence.

The plaintiff's white predecessor on the property had pursued commercial ventures, such as -- I believe he talked about a soccer field and a golf facility. He had implemented an equestrian venture there. But according to his testimony, he got along just fine with all the neighbors. But when the black family moves in, they don't get along fine with him.

THE COURT: I guess they thought he was going

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to use the property as a vineyard. Is that right?

That seems to be the heart of MS. WATSON: the defendant's position as far as what the true motivation is. I will say on, I believe, January 2 the plaintiff sent an e-mail to his neighbors saying that planting grapes was a personal hobby and interest and so not a serious commercial venture plan. So from the plaintiff's point of view, that doesn't seem to really hold water. That seems pretextual as far as a reason to go after him so aggressively.

If I may, I'd like to draw the Court's attention to the Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 to our opposition to summary judgment filed by Defendant Mr. Roberts. That's a declaration by Mr. Thomas of an event that happened recently on June 24.

The plaintiff held a private gathering, a party, and all of his guests were black. He observed Mr. Casagrande stopping his guests as they were trying to find his property and later in the evening was advised that the sheriff's office was inundated with complaints of noise and marijuana smoke coming from the plaintiff's property, which was -- there wasn't even alcohol served at this party. No one even smoked a 24 cigarette. There certainly wasn't any marijuana smoking, and the deputies advised that there wasn't a

1 noise issue.

So I would put forth to you that false complaints of marijuana smoke and unruly behavior from the only black family on the block who has their black guests over is a racially-charged event.

THE COURT: Why would the Court consider that in evaluating whether at the time he filed the lawsuit he had an adequate factual basis?

MS. WATSON: What our position is is that Mr. Thomas was under attack and feeling like he was being run out of his neighborhood.

THE COURT: I understand his feelings about that. Tell me: Other than the Panera meeting as to each of these three defendants, what is it that was alleged in -- what was the factual basis for it? Begin with Casagrande. I understand that the one allegation that was made against him -- and that is that he said to one of the workmen, Why are you working for a black man -- what was the factual basis for that?

MS. WATSON: Mr. Thomas explained in his deposition testimony that his business partner had relayed to him that the arborist had told her that someone who works under the arborist had relayed to him that Mr. Casagrande had said that, had said, Why are you working for a black man?

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Mr. Thomas also testified that those
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   contractors who had worked for him had told him that
  Mr. Roberts, the remaining defendant, was --
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             THE COURT:
                         Just stick with Casagrande.
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  Other than that statement in the Panera meeting, what
  was the basis for the claim other than the filing of
7
   the lawsuit?
             MS. WATSON: Well, his participation in the
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9
  lawsuit, and plaintiff was advised by developer Jim
10 Brown that Mr. Roberts was the ringleader of the whole
11 Ineighborhood. I mean, these neighbors presented as a
12 united front. They talked about, We are not going to
13 let this happen.
             They are a united front. Their version is
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  they're a united front against the winery. But from
  the plaintiff's point of view, they're a united front
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  against -- they weren't a united front against
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  Mr. Pomata, the white predecessor, but they are against
19
  the plaintiff.
20
             THE COURT:
                         I understand that position.
                                                       Just
21
  so I'm clear, other than that, anything else on
22
  Casagrande?
23
             MS. WATSON: I believe that pretty much sums
24 lit up.
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             THE COURT:
                         What about Berlin?
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It's similar to what I've just 1 MS. WATSON: 2 explained about Mr. Casagrande.

THE COURT: All right. And Curtis, separate from the Panera meeting and the filing of the lawsuit, what was the basis for bringing the claim against him? I believe it is the same as I've MS. WATSON:

THE COURT: All right.

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described.

MS. WATSON: Our point is we understand that these defendants have been dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion, but from what the plaintiff knew when he filed the lawsuit --

And I would say also from some of what's been learned in discovery as far as -- you know, the Thomases were completely intimidated and scared by that meeting at Panera. They felt ambushed and got a clear message that these households were not going to put up with what they wanted to do with their property.

And so my point is we understand these were dismissed, but under these circumstances, the severe and chilling sanction of punishing the plaintiff with attorneys' fees is not warranted.

As Your Honor knows, the attorneys' fees 24 Naward provision of these civil rights statutes is lintended to allow private citizens to be private,

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Attorneys General to maintain the robustness of these
   civil rights laws, not to punish them when they get
   their claims dismissed on 12(b)(6).
 4
             So thank you.
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             THE COURT: All right. Any other defendants
  want to respond?
6
7
             MR. VIETH:
                         I have nothing further, Your
  Honor.
8
9
                         All right. Anyone else?
             THE COURT:
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             MR. GUTKOWSKI:
                             No, Your Honor. We would --
11
  I'm sorry.
12
             THE COURT: Come to the podium, please.
13
             MR. GUTKOWSKI:
                             To the extent that Your
  Honor -- and based upon your comments, I don't believe
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  you do. But to the extent Your Honor lends any
  credence to the declaration or the notion as to what
17
  recently occurred on the property, there are several
18
  photographs that I reviewed yesterday that show that
19
  the declaration submitted by Mr. Thomas doesn't carry
  any water in that respect, that this was a large
21
  function.
             There was drinking. There was smoking,
22
  etc., etc., etc. So to the extent that Your Honor in
  any way is moved by that argument, I'm happy to submit
24 Ithose things. Otherwise, I have nothing further, Your
25
  Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         All right. Counsel, do you have
  anything further?
3
             MR. OSTER:
                         Your Honor, I only have one brief
  point with respect to the Berlins, and I think it also
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5
  applies to the Curtises and the Casagrandes. There was
  not a shred of evidence, not any evidence that
  Mr. Berlin or his wife -- clearly his wife -- had ever
  done, said, or participated in anything of a racial
9
  nature.
10
             The Panera meeting is noteworthy not for what
   the people disagree about, but it's noteworthy for what
12 Mr. Thomas, his wife, and the defendants all agree.
13
  They were concerned that there not be commercial
  activity on the property.
15
             Now, it's true that Mr. Pomata, the former
  owner, did have his son's wedding there.
16
                                             But to try to
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  compare that to --
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             THE COURT: Well, the allegation was, as I
19
  recall, using it for other commercial purposes.
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             MR. OSTER:
                         There was an allegation that he
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  had considered using it for other commercial purposes
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  but not that he had.
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             THE COURT:
                         I see.
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             MR. OSTER:
                         At the end of the day, the
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parties agree that what was discussed at the meeting

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was a desire not to have commercial activity on the
  property, which is perfectly reasonable. Whether it's
  right or wrong is irrelevant, but it's perfectly
  reasonable.
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5
             The entire defense, as I understand, to
  attorneys' fees is, Well, we really thought -- we
6
7
  thought that we were being treated differently because
  of our race. I think the Fourth Circuit's decision in
  Lotz makes clear that that's insufficient.
10
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
11
             MR. OSTER:
                         Thank you, Judge.
12
             THE COURT:
                         Plaintiff's counsel, let me ask
13 you a question about this. What is the evidence and
14
  the allegations as far as the previous owner's actual
15
  commercial use of the property?
16
             MS. WATSON: I believe it's -- well, as far
  as the complaint, we did take a deposition of
17
18
  Mr. Pomata, and he testified to having considered
19
  commercial ventures.
20
             THE COURT:
                         I understand.
                                        Was it ever
21
  actually used for commercial pursuits?
22
             MS. WATSON: I believe he used it for an
  equestrian commercial venture on part of the property.
  I believe he used it for equestrian purposes.
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remaining defendant has testified he didn't have as

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much of a problem with that pursuit versus a vineyard.
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             If I may, I would just like to reiterate not
  wanting a vineyard next door is arguably a legitimate
  reason. But the plaintiffs had tried to ease his
  neighbor's fears about some big commercial vineyard via
5
  e-mail by saying that was a hobby and he didn't have a
6
7
  particular -- he didn't have a specific plan for that.
             You know, this is -- that is a dispute.
8
9
  There are two perspectives on that. I don't think that
  that makes -- I don't think that that justifies calling
10
  his claims groundless or baseless or warranting a
12
  sanction.
13
             THE COURT:
                         I'll go back and read the
  complaint, but I thought there was an actual allegation
15
  Ithat the previous owner had, in fact, used it for
  commercial properties, which is what caused the
  plaintiff to think that he was being treated
17
18
  differently than the previous owner.
19
             MS. WATSON: I think you're right, Your
20
  Honor.
           I think he used it for an equestrian commercial
21
  venture.
22
                         What was the basis for that
             THE COURT:
  belief? Was that, in fact, borne out by discovery?
2.4
             MS. WATSON:
                         No.
                               I believe the plaintiff was
25
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advised that by another witness, but I apologize.

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don't know exactly who.
 2
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
 3
             MR. WAYNE:
                         Your Honor, it is not my motion,
 4
  but may I be heard?
 5
                         Yes, Mr. Wayne.
             THE COURT:
 6
                         So, Your Honor, with regard to
             MR. WAYNE:
 7
   the prior commercial use -- so there are 12 lots.
  Everybody who bought a lot was told that there was a
  prior existing use on Lot 3 which was the equestrian
  center.
10
11
             THE COURT:
                         That's the plaintiff's current
12 property?
13
             MR. WAYNE:
                         No, it is not.
14
             Anyway, the equestrian center was primarily
  on Lot 3. The horses were allowed to run onto Lot 4A.
  That was a prior existing commercial use that when all
17
  the defendants -- when they all bought it, when
18
  everybody bought, it was said, This is part of the
19
  deal. There was no issue about whether there was an
20
  existing homeowners association with covenants, but
21
  that was part of the deal. The equestrian center was
22
  there and was grandfathered in.
23
             After my client bought his property and
24 Mr. Pomata was marketing his property -- that's the
25
  property Mr. Thomas eventually bought.
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What lot number is that?
1
             THE COURT:
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                         That would be 4A.
             MR. WAYNE:
 3
             THE COURT:
                         Lot 4A.
 4
             MR. WAYNE:
                         So Lot 4A when it was being
5
   marketed --
                         The plaintiff's property?
6
             THE COURT:
7
             MR. WAYNE:
                         Correct.
8
             -- by Mr. Pomata, he was entertaining offers
  from individuals who wanted to build a soccer training
  facility and wanted to build a golf academy.
                                                  This is
  in the spring of 2015. So those proposed sales were
12 met with strong resistance by my client and the other
13 defendants.
14
             They were urging Mr. Pomata, A, not to do
  that, to sell to commercial use, number one; number
  two, petitioning the Loudoun County Board of
  Supervisors and the zoning people that the property
17
18
  should not be -- they were against the use of Lot 4A as
19
  a soccer academy or a golf academy. So this all
  happened long before Mr. Thomas bought Lot 4A.
21
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
22
             MR. WAYNE: We're talking about disparate
  treatment here. The notion that Mr. Pomata was treated
24 differently by the defendants than Mr. Thomas simply is
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not true. They were against commercial use of Lot 4A

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when Mr. Pomata was seeking to sell it to commercial
2 buyers.
3
             THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
4
             All right. I'm going to look at the record
5
   in a little more detail and take it under advisement.
  I'll get you a decision just as soon as I can.
6
7
             All right. Thank you.
8
             MS. WATSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
9
             MR. VIETH: Thank you, Your Honor.
10
             MR. WAYNE: Thank you, Your Honor.
11
             THE COURT:
                         The Court will stand in recess.
12
                       Time: 11:20 a.m.
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21
        I certify that the foregoing is a true and
22
    accurate transcription of my stenographic notes.
23
24
25
                             Rhonda F. Montgomery, CCR, RPR
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